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BEING A PARTY TO TRAFFICKING MARIHUANA 
Regina v. Belacourt The County Court of Cariboo, Dawson Creek, April 
1984 
Two undercover R.C.M.Police Officers attended at a beer parlour where 
the accused was sitting with a party the officers knew. The officers 
spoke to this party and in the conversation complained about the price 
of marihuana. The accused intervened and implied that if they dealt 
with "a middle man" they would have to pay steep prices. Without 
asking the accused for assistance, the accused suggested to the 
officers "next time come and see me". Expressing curiousity for what 
price the accused could deliver, the one officer was told that for 
$1,800 he could get a pound of Red Hair marihuana. The officer 
responded that, subject to the approval of a partner in a nearby town, 
he was interested in doing business with the accused. 
At subsequent meetings between the one officer and the accused, the 
latter made it quite clear that he was a person who, in some way, 
could make large quantities of drugs available to the officer. 
The officer acted as a "wary and cagey" purchaser and indicated that 
he would consider the price and the offer. At the third meeting the 
officer said he now had the O.K. from his partner and he was in a 
position to buy. The accused asked: "How does a pound sound"? The 
officer agreed, rejected delivery for that day and replied: "No, 
tomorrow". The following day the two officers met with the accused 
who informed them that the price was now $2,300 for one pound. When 
the officers objected to the boost the accused said "All I'm making is 
$100". He also told the officers that they would have to pay in 
advance. The officers indicated that the conditions and price were 
unacceptable and in addition, the officers showed reluctance to deal 
through an intermediary. The accused replied: "I'll speak to my man". 
At the subsequent meeting the officers were met by the principal 
trafficker Lebeuf, who said, "Terry is looking for you". Less than a 
minute later the accused (Terry) arrived and joined the officers. One 
of the officers told Lebeuf that $2,300 was an unreasonable price and 
that he was willing to pay $2,000. Lebeuf countered to sell a lesser 
amount for $1, 650 and , added the accused, "It s all quartered and 
ready to go". "Let's go for it" said the one officer to his 
colleague. 
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Next the place of the transaction had to be determined. 
suggested "Why don't we just do it at Dennis' place" 
Lebeuf). In the end it was decided to meet on a certain 
country. The meeting and agreed to transaction took place 
officers and Lebeuf. The accused was not present. 
The accused 
(Dennis is 
road in the 
between the 
The accused was charged with the offence of trafficking. The Crown, 
of course, relied on section 21 C.C. which states that anyone who aids 
or abets anyone to commit an offence is a party to that offence and is 
hence as punishable as the principal offender. 
The accused did not contradict the evidence of the officers. He 
testified he had liked the one officer who had bought him several 
glasses of beer. He had wanted to do the officer a good turn and had 
promised him to keep his ears open and if he heard of a good deal he 
would pass it on. He said not to have expected to receive a 
commission or to make any profit from any deal he would arrange for 
the officer. He denied to have said that there was only $100 in the 
transaction for him. 
The defence the accused advanced is not unique. To be a party to the 
offence of trafficking in these circumstances, one has to aid and abet 
the trafficker. The accused claimed he simply aided the purchaser and 
not the vendor. 
The Court rejected the defence and held that, although one could find 
that the accused had assisted the buyer, he had equally aided the 
trafficker. The following facts led up to this conclusion: 
1. When the accused at the first meeting said that he could provide 
one pound of Red Hair marihuana, "this remark by itself 
constitutes an offer to sell the drug ••• " to the officer; 
2. During the entire discussion that led to the transaction, the 
accused made it clear he was speaking on behalf of another person 
and consequently he was aiding that person; 
3. When Lebeuf, the principal trafficker, met the officer for the 
first time, he (Lebeuf) said: "Terry is looking for you" (Terry 
is the accused). This, coupled with the fact that the accused 
showed up shortly after (while there was no need for him to be 
there as he by now knew that his "friend" could very well look 
after himself) leads to the inferrence that he was not there 
exclusively to look after the officer's interest but was there 
principally in aid of the seller, Lebeuf; 
4. When the accused said: "It 's all quartered and ready to go", he 
stressed the convenience of the packaging and did promote the 
sale; 
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5. When the location for the transaction was discussed, the accused 
said: "Why don't we just do it at Dennis' place" and "Why don't 
you follow us down to Denny's place". The "we" and, particularly 
the "us", meant the accused and Lebeuf; and 
6. The accused had shown during the entire events that he favoured 
the seller and looked after his interest. 
The aggregate of all this is that the accused aided Lebeuf, the 
principal trafficker. 
Accused was found guilty. 
* * * * * 
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DRIVER'S LICENCE SUSPENSION NOTICE 
Regina v. Mcintosh 
March 1984. 
County Court of Vancouver, Vancouver CC840382 
Mr. Mcintosh appealed the suspension of his driver's licence. On 
January 17, 1984 he received an unsigned notice from the 
Superintendent of Motor Vehicles that he was prohibited from driving 
for a period of 6 months unless he could, in writing, show sufficient 
cause why the prohibition should be for a shorter time. 
A two page submission was sent to the Superintendent. This resulted 
in an unsigned notice from the Deputy Superintendent, without any 
reference to the appellant's submissions, that his driver's licence 
was suspended for 6 months. 
The County Court Judge held that the notice and the order was a 
nullity. He observed that the suspension of a privilege cannot be 
accomplished by an unsigned notice from the authority who has the 
power to suspend. Such suspension can only be done for reasons 
established by statute. Particularly when invited submissions are 
made to show cause why the power to suspend should not be exercised, 
the Superintendent must give reason for his decision. Said the Court: 
"The Superintendent or his deputy, is required to consider 
individually each case proposed for a suspension of driver's 
licence privileges. He must consider each case on its own 
merits, including a consideration of the submission made, if 
any, by the person subject of the proceedings. In the 
absence of the signature and in the absence of any reference 
to the submission even being received, let alone considered, 
I am of the view that the purported prohibition is 
invalid ...... 




IS UNJUSTIFIED CONTINUATION OF CUSTODY AN 
INFRINGEMENT OF s. 9 OF THE CHARTER? 
Regina v. Bevan-Pritchard County Court of Vancouver Island Victoria 
Registry 30459 - April 1984. 
The accused was involved in a motor vehicle accident. The investiga-
ting officer who considered her to be intoxicated, made a demand for 
breath samples and arrested her for impaired driving. The accused 
refused to blow and was lodged in cells. She appealed her conviction 
of impaired driving and failure to blow. 
The grounds for appeal, based on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
are interesting. The accused was arrested at 9:55 p.m. The officer 
booked her after she had refused to blow, and could not say when she 
was released. However, he did not argue the accuracy of his depart-
ment's records which show that she was not released until 9: 15 the 
next morning. No evidence was adduced on the justification of the 
continuation of the accused's detention other than that she was too 
intoxicated at 11:00 p.m. on the evening previous to her release. 
We saw in Mason and Basse, Brown and Smith* an example on how the 
police may be civilly liable if custody is continued despite the fact 
that the public interest as defined in the Criminal Code, has been 
satisfied. This includes effecting an arrest which in terms of 
requisite grounds and beliefs is lawful but where, due to a lack of 
"public interest", the law states that the officer "shall" not 
arrest. In cases of custody the law is equally compelling and 
dictates that an officer-in-charge "shall" release in the absence of 
public interest issues. 
In these criminal proceedings, the accused raised unjustified continu-
ation of custody as a constitutional defence. She submitted that her 
continued custody had inf ringed her right not to be arbitrarily 
detained (section 10 Charter of Rights and Freedoms). She drew the 
Court's attention to section 24(1) of the Charter which authorizes the 
Judiciary to remedy an infringement of rights or freedoms as guaran-
teed by that Charter. She suggested to the Court that an acquittal 
was an appropriate remedy in the circumstances. This remedy had been 
invoked by a County Court Judge in Nelson, B. C.** who found that the 
onus was on the police officer in charge to comply with the provision 
of section 452 c.c. and •••• 
"If he is unable to meet this burden, it is mandatory that 
the person be released. The onus does not lie upon the 
accused to meet the conditions of the release". 
* See page 28 of Volume 16 of this publication. 
** The queen v. Mcintosh, Nelson registry CC 33/83, February 1984. 
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As we saw in the civil proceedings, where a person seeks compensation 
for unlawful arrest or detention, all the plaintiff has to show is 
that he was arrested or detained and the onus is then on the defendant 
to show that the arrest or detention was lawful. However, where a 
claim is made for a remedy under section 24 of the Charter related to 
arbitrary detention, it seems (at least so far into the history of 
this constitutional declaration) that the onus to show that on th,e 
balance of probabilities the arrest or detention amounted to an 
infringement of a right or freedom is on the accused in criminal cases 
and the plaintiff in civil proceedings. 
The County Court Judge in this case held that if the accused wished to 
raise this constitutional defence there should have been an indication 
of this to the trial judge or Crown Counsel so that witnesses on that 
point could have been called. 
In this case that was not done and the issue of arbitrary detention 
was not even raised at trial. All cases indicate that the onus to 
show an infringement is on the accused. Furthermore, the County Court 
Judge held: 
"In the appeal before me, the only fact established by the 
evidence is that the appellant spent approximately 11 hours 
overnight in the gaol cell. Standing alone, that does not 
establish a prima facie violation of Section 9 of the 
Charter, nor, for that matter, under s. 452 c.c ••• " 
* * * * * 
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SUSPECT CLAIMS HE WILL NOT SAY ANYTHING UNTIL HE HAS SPOKEN TO A 
LAWYER, YET HE MAKES A VOLUNTARY INCULPATORY COMMENT. 
ADMISSIBILITY - CHARTER OF RIGHTS & FREEDOMS 
Regina v. Manninen 8 C.C.C. (3d) 193 
Ontario Court of Appeal, November 1983. 
The defendant had stood with arms across his chest in front of a 
storekeeper, gun in one hand and a knife in the other. When he got 
the money he demanded, he made his getaway in a gold Lincoln Continen-
tal which he still drove when apprehended a little later. The car had 
been stolen. 
The officers who arrested the defendent read him "the works"; notice 
of arrest, right to counsel, caution in respect to right to remain 
silent and secondary caution in the event another person in authority 
had influenced him in respect to making a statement. The defendant 
commented in response that it sounded like an American T.V. show. He 
also said: "Prove it, I ain't saying anything until I see my lawyer. 
I want to see my lawyer". Despite this indication that he intended to 
retain and instruct counsel, the officers asked the accused if the 
sweater and knives that were found in the Continental belonged to him 
and what they were used for. He answered, "What the fuck do you think 
they are used for? Are you fucking stupid?" And when asked again he 
said, "Of course it's mine. You fuckers are really stupid. Don't 
bother me anymore. I'm not saying anything until I see my lawyer. 
Just fuck off. You fuckers have to prove it". 
The trial Judge had held that the accused's eloquent speech had been a 
voluntary one and was therefore admissible in evidence. This despite 
the accused's testimony that he had said these things as he was afraid 
of the officers. He had also claimed that the statement should be 
excluded as his request to firstly consult a lawyer had been ignored. 
The accused was convicted of robbery and possession of the stolen 
car. He appealed. 
Defence counsel argued that where voluntariness used to be the sole 
consideration whether or not to admit a statement like this, addition-
al matters have now been considered in view of our Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. He submitted that from the time the accused said: "I 
ain't saying anything until I have seen my lawyer", all activities 
involving the accused in their investigation should have ceased. They 
simply should not have asked him any further questions and given him 
an opportunity to call his lawyer. 
The Crown retorted that the questioning had been an "on scene" one and 
had the accuser s request been made at the police station a phone 
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would have been made available This, the evidence revealed, was the 
intention of the officers. Furthermore the accused had not specifi-
cally asked to phone his lawyer, not even at the police station. He 
did apparently, via his family, make his need for a lawyer known, when 
about six hours after his arrest a lawyer phoned him, the accused was 
immediately put on the line. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal went the route of section 24 of the 
Charter to determine the admissibility of the statement. It firstly 
held that "the appellant's rights under s. lO(b) of the Charter were 
seriously infringed by the conduct of the police officers". When the 
accused indicated his wishes in regards to his rights, he was basi-
cally asked three questions. 1. What is your name; 2. What is your 
address, and 3. "Where is the knife that you used when you ripped off 
the ••• (victim)". The first two were innocuous and not improper. 
The third one was and the answer was "devastating to the defence". 
The Court said that in view of the defendant's clear intentions to 
seek legal counsel, police should have stopped questioning him and 
have made a phone available to him. The accused had not waived his 
rights to counsel before answering the questions by police. Admission 
of the evidence would, in view of the infringement of the defendant's 
right to retain and instruct counsel, bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute, held the Court 
Conviction set aside. 
New trial ordered. 
Comment: On page 38 of Volume 12 of this publication is a synopsis 
and comment on post Charter reasons for judgment by the B. C. Court of 
Appeal in R. v. Spearman. Spearman said before his interview and 
several times during, that he wanted to speak to a lawyer. However, 
he continued to answer questions and confessed to murdering a woman. 
The B. C. Court held that the accused (as was Manninen) was experi-
enced in dealing with police and was not as he claimed, intimidated to 
give the statement. It was implied that he should have requested a 
phone to speak to a lawyer and that the officers were not obliged to 
provide him with a phone simply because he claimed he wanted to seek 
counsel. 
It seems that the highest Court in B. C. has a different view on this 
issue than their counterpart in Ontario. 
* * * * * 
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CONSPIRACY AND BEING A PARTY 
TO THE SUBSTANTIVE OFFENCE 
Re Meikle and The Queen 9 c.c.c. (2d) 91 
Ontario High Court of Justice 
Mr. Meikle, the owner of a van, approached his co-worker, Mr. Madill 
and asked him to take his van, drive it to a certain location and 
steal certain parts off it. Meikle would report the van stolen and 
when located, claim from the insurance company for the stolen parts. 
After the claim was paid, Madill was to re-install the parts. Madill 
was offered payment for this service. 
The deal was made over a few days and when everything was agreed to, 
Meikle turned the keys to the van over to Madill to make the fake 
theft as effortless as possible. However, Madill turned the keys and 
the scheme over to the police who met Mr. Meikle when he delivered the 
van to the location where the theft was supposed to take place. 
Meikle was charged with counselling Madill to commit the indictable 
offence of fraud over $200. "You can't do that" retorted Mr. Meikle. 
He reasoned that had things gone as was planned, he and he alone would 
have been the principal offender if the charge was fraud. In the 
circumstances, he argued, Madill could not commit a fraud; consequent-
ly how could he counsel a person to commit an offence he cannot commit 
as a principal. Apparently the Judge who conducted the preliminary 
hearing, was not to be persuaded, and Meikle petitioned this superior 
Court to remove the order of committal to stand trial. 
The Justice of the Superior Court reiterated that the offence of coun-
selling is complete the moment "solicitation or incitement" occurs. 
Although Meikle was the principal offender, Madill was "potentially 
particeps criminis" (party to the offence). This by virtue of section 
2l(l)(b) & (c) c.c. 
Defence counsel also argued that section 21 c.c. cannot be relied upon 
to establish the ingredients for an offence under section 422 c.c. 
Counselling offences which is not committed). The Court pointed out 
that section 422 C.C. applies even where a person is incited to 
"commit offences" and not necessarily a specific or substantive 
offence. 
In other words, if one commits a crime; aids and abets a person in 
committing a crime; or forms an intention in common with another 
person to carry out and assist one another in the commission of an 
unlawful act, he is a party to the crime whether or not he is the 
principal offender. 
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If one counsels procures or incites another person to commit an 
indictable offence, then if the offence is not committed the 
counsellor has committed an indictable offence of counselling and is 
liable to the same punishment as a person who attempts to commit that 
offence. The Court held that section 422 C.C. does not preclude the 
counselling of another person to be a party to a specific of fence as 
long as the offence counselled are physically and legally possible. 
* * * * * 
Application dismissed. 




Reference re an Application for An Authorization, Alberta Court of 
Appeal. 10 c.c.c. (3d) 1. 
Our senior governments may refer hypothetical constitutional or legal 
questions to the most superior court in their jurisdiction. This is 
known as a "referen.ce". The practice is not too often applied as it 
is seen as a short-cut in the judicial law making process. The Court 
simply will not have the benefit of the judicial opinions of the 
"Courts below". When an issue comes to a Court of Appeal or the 
Supreme Court of Canada, it is by the appeal process and it has been 
thoroughly argued in the lower Courts and judicial opinions have been 
expressed on the subject. By the "reference" method the issue comes 
directly to the provincial Courts of Appeal if the provincial 
government has referred it, or the Supreme Court of Canada if the 
reference is by the Federal government. 
These references are usually made when the legal or constitutional 
question put, is too urgent and pressing to let it be answered by 
means of the time consuming appeal process. 
In any event, the Alberta cabinet upon the recommendation of the 
Attorney General asked the Alberta Court of Appeal: 
1. Does a person acting under a judicial authorization to intercept 
a private communication have, by necessary implication, the 
authorization "to enter any place at which private communications 
are proposed to be intercepted ••• for the purpose of installing, 
monitoring, repairing or removing any electromagnetic, acoustic 
mechanical or other device?" 
2 Can a judge who grants the authorization expressly authorize a 
person acting under the authorization, "to enter any place at 
which private communications are proposed to be intercepted for 
the purposes outlined in question 1 above"? 
The majority decision said "No" to both questions. 
It had been argued that if a person receives authorization to do 
something he automatically is empowered to do all things "ancillary 
thereto". Also, the purpose of the authorization is to invade the 
privacy of an individual and the document is therefore a licence to 
make this possible, even in the privacy of his home. 
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Three out of the five Justices who decided on these questions found it 
"disquieting" that the State would argue that an authorization was 
such a licence and they found strength for their views in a decision 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1981.* The Court had issued a 
warrant pursuant to s. 105 (1) C.C. which authorized the seizure of 
all firearms in the possession of Mr. Colet. Police wanted, on the 
strength of the warrant, to search Mr. Colet's home. He, however, 
felt police had no right to be on his property, leave alone search his 
home and he took shots at the officers from the roof of his "rudiment-
ary shelter". This resulted in two counts of attempted murder of 
which the accused was acquitted. The Supreme Court of Canada held 
that section 105(1) C.C. does not authorize the entering of private 
property to execute the warrant. The majority of the Justices dealing 
with these two questions under the Privacy Act held that the Supreme 
Court of Canada came out in the Colet case "as standing for the propo-
sition that a statute authorizing the invasion of property must do so 
expressly". (Section 105 CC now includes a provision to search). 
The Crown had also advanced the argument that when police have a 
warrant for the arrest of a person they have the power to search 
private property on reasonable grounds for believing the wanted person 
is there. The three Alberta Court of Appeal Justices held that the 
cases** indicating that proposition are distinct from what is proposed 
here. The "respect for privacy" is shown in police having to announce 
their presence and business. What is proposed by the Crown here is 
"surreptitious entry". In law the two are miles apart. 
The court's "No" to the questions is pretty well summed up in the 
following passage of the reasons for judgment when it dealt with the 
intent of the lawmakers: 
"If Parliament knew that police forces were engaging in and 
wanted to engage in trespassory entry then one can say it's 
silence was a refusal to give that authority as easily as 
one can say it intended to give the authority..... That 
surveillance was hitherto done by trespass does not imply 
parliamentary approval of the practice. Nothing put before 
us leads me to conclude that Parliament must have understood 
it was necessarily authorizing surreptitious entry". 
The dissenting opinions were in favour of allowing the judiciary to 
include the authorization for entry of private property in the author-
ization for the interception of private communication. In other 
words, the two dissenting justices said "No" also to question 1 and 
"Yes to question 2. 
* Coleg v. The queen (1981) 57 .c.c. (2d) 105. Also see page 18 of 
Volume #1 of this publication. 
** Semayne Case (1604) 5 Co Rep. 91.a. 77 E.R. 194. - Eceles v. 
Bourque et. al. (1974) 19 c.c.c. (2) 129. 
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This all adds up that in Alberta the judiciary may not include author-
ization to enter private property to intercept private communica-
tions. And it was the unanimous opinion that an authorization to 
intercept does not by necessary implication authorize such entry. 
Despite this decisive judgement by the Alberta Court of Appeal, it 
seems that its Ontario counterpart feels differently about the issue 
of surreptitious entry. The following case demonstrates that clearly~ 
The Queen and Papelia, Monaco, Koaches, Cavasin and Fishes Ontario 
Court of Appeal, August 1984. 
Police received authorization to intercept the private communications 
of the persons mentioned above. Besides the usual telephone taps, 
police placed listening devices in the cars owned by Papalia and 
Monaco. Investigation had given them reason for believing that 
conversations related to the crimes under investigation took place in 
those cars. Needless to say that no permission to plant the devices 
was sought from the owners of the cars. Police also entered surrep-
titiously the offices and the boardroom of Papalia and Monaco's 
business and placed listening devices. The officers did so on the 
strength of the authorization which included: "... and for that 
purpose to enter such places as may be necessary in order to install, 
monitor and remove any • • • devices ••• " They were also ordered to 
carry out these surreptitious entrees by their commanding officer. 
The trial judge had disallowed any evidence obtained from intercep-
tions of communications in the cars. However, he had held that those 
resulting from bugging the offices and boardroom were admissible. The 
trial resulted in an acquittal and the Crown appealed. The surrep-
titious entrees and their propriety became the highlight of the 
reasons for judgement by the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
The reason why the trial judge has disallowed the intercepted communi-
cations in the cars, was that police, prior to applying for the 
authorization, had knowledge of the suspected conversations in the 
cars. Despite the fact that they by statute (s. 178.12(l)(e) CC) were 
compelled to include in their application, "a general description of 
the nature and location of the place, if known ••• " they had not 
included the cars. 
Neither would the judge allow the derivative evidence from the "in-car 
communications". 
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was wrong. He 
had looked behind the authorization while it was valid in its face. 
Examining the grounds or validity of the authorization amounted to a 
collateral attack on a Supreme Court authorization. If the defence 
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wanted to challenge the superior court's decision to grant the author-
ization or its content, the proceedings must be for that purpose in 
the Court that granted it. All the trial judge has to concern himself 
with is that the interceptions were lawfully made and proper notices 
were given; that named and unnamed persons fall within the authoriza-
tion, etc. However he is not to go behind it. The interceptions in 
the cars were lawful and the intercepted communications and its 
derivative evidence were held to be admissible. 
The defence then urged the Court of Appeal to rule inadmissible the 
communications intercepted in the off ices and boardroom. Locks were 
picked to plant the necessary devices and surreptitious entrees were 
made. This was not pursuant to the authorization and, therefore, it 
ought to be inadmissible, said defence counsel. To answer this 
question the Court of Appeal referred to decisions* prior to the 
Charter being effective. 
These decisions basically say that an authorization to intercept a 
private communication is not a licence to break the law and that 
authorities who assault, cause harm or trespass are on their own. In 
such circumstances, the authorization does not give them any protec-
tion. However, if the authorities resort to these methods to inter-
cept the private communications referred to in the authorization, that 
does not make the interception itself unlawful. One could say that 
the unlawful means did not affect the lawful ends, after all, the 
interception itself is pursuant to the judicial licence to intercept. 
It is important to note, however, that also authorizations that 
included permission to enter places to install and remove devices, 
were frowned upon by the Courts of Appeal. There was an apparent 
consensus that there is nothing in law that enables a judge to 
authorize illegal acts to accommodate the interception. Nevertheless, 
as pointed out above, if police officers committed such acts, it made 
the interceptions not unlawful or the evidence obtained thereby 
inadmissible; and where an authorization includes a licence to tres-
pass, it adds nothing to the document and does not invalidate the 
licence to intercept private communications. Furthermore, the tres-
pass is not a part of the interception and, therefore, the unlawful-
ness of the former does not contaminate the latter. 
Dissenting judicial views, are best summarized by quoting from a 
minority judgement in the Lyons case: 
"A police officer does not act in accordance with an author-
ization when he carries out the instructions of the author-
izing judge in an unlawful manner, namely, by unlawfully 
trespassing to install and maintain the monitoring devices". 
* R. v. Lo Serge (1975) 26 CCC (2d) 388; R. v. Welsh and Tonnuzzi 
(No. 6) (1977) 32 c.c.c. (2) 363; R. v. Lyons, et. al. 69 c.c.c. 
(2d) 318 (B. C. Court of Appeal) 1980. 
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The defence urged the Ontario Court of Appeal to follow this dissen-
ting view, particularly in view of the current Charter provisions. 
The opinion of their Alberta counterparts, expressed in the 1983 
Reference, was of course also drawn to the attention of the Ontario 
Justices. 
However, this was to no avail and they were more impressed with the 
observations of the Chief Justice of the Alberta Court of Appeal (a 
dissenting judgement). His views are similar to those expressed by 
the U. S. Supreme Court*. The Alberta Chief Justice observed: 
• • • the serious invasion is not the entry upon a person's 
property, but the entry into his mind by intercepting 
communications intended to be private communications. Once 
that invasion was authorized, the means were merely inciden-
tal" 
He is of the opinion that Parliament knew the distinction between 
"wiretapping" and "bugging" and that an authorization includes both. 
Parliament understood that surreptitious entry is simply an integral 
part of electronic eavesdropping. 
Although the reasons for judgement are lengthy and somewhat confusing 
in some places, it is obvious that the Ontario Court of Appeal agreed 
with the dissenting views of the Alberta Chief Justice. It held that 
necessary entries are the exercise of powers ancillary to the authori-
zation. 
All evidence admitted. 
Note: The Alberta reference case has been appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Canada and we should be certain of this law in the not too 
distant future. 
* * * * * 
* Delia v. The United States of America 441 u. s. 238 99 S C.E 1682 
(1979) 
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MECHANICAL CONDITION OF THE 
MOTOR VEHICLE INVOLVED IN THE OFFENCE OF DANGEROUS DRIVING 
Regina v. Claxton, County Court of Vancouver Island Victoria No. 
32089-T March 1984. 
The accused began a right hand turn when something that happened in 
the area of the left front wheel caused him to lose control of the 
car. In addition, his brakes failed and an accident resulted. He was 
charged with dangerous driving. 
The mechanical condition of the car was abysmal. The brakes were 
metal on metal with the drum near breaking point; the steering mechan-
ism was badly worn; tires were without or little tread; and the stud 
holes in the wheels were so badly worn that a wheel could be removed 
without loosening the nuts. As a matter of fact, the accused had just 
put the spare wheel on one of the front hubs as the original wheel had 
dropped off. In addition to all of this the accused had been 
drinking. 
The Court found that the mechanical failure was the "approximate" 
cause of the accident. If that is so, argued the counsel for the 
defence, the accused should be acquitted. 
The Court repeated the wellknown ingredients of the of fence of danger-
ous driving: 
1. driving without due care a prudent person would exercise in the 
circumstances, (with regard, of course, to the factors mentioned 
in s. 221 (4) c.c.); and 
2. failure to exercise such care and thereby, in fact, endanger the 
lives and safety of others whether or not harm resulted. 
The question was how the horrendous condition of the car did fit into 
all of this. The Court found on the evidence that the accused knew or 
ought to have known the condition of the vehicle. He owned the car 
and was an experienced driver who understood the mechanical anatomy of 
the car. The English Court of Criminal Appeal was quoted in regards 
to the defence of mechanical failure. It had held that this defence 
simply has no application 
". • • where the defect is known to the driver or should have 
been discovered by him had he exercised reasonable pru-
dence. To drive a motor car in such circumstances is mani-
festly dangerous". 
Accused convicted. 
* * * * * 
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CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
SHOULD PROCEDURAL ERRORS RESULT IN CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES AT TRIAL? 
The Queen and Erickson, B. C. Court of Appeal, June 14, 1984 
Vancouver Registry CA001770 
Police, armed with a search warrant under the Narcotic Control Act, 
searched the appellant's home. No narcotics were found, but a 
quantity of blank driver's licence forms of various provinces were 
contained in the accused's safe. He was consequently arrested and 
charged under s. 324 c.c. (possession of government marks) which 
carries a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment. 
The arresting officer was aware that the accused was on parole and 
immediately upon arrest contacted the parole officer. A warrant 
suspending the parole and ordering that Erickson be delivered to a 
federal penitentiary was issued a couple of hours later. In view of 
this revocation and the warrant, Erickson was not brought before a 
Justice until 3 days later. Police had assumed that there was no need 
to comply with 454 C.C. (appearance without unreasonable delay) as 
Erickson's detention was on account of the warrant and not the charge 
of possessing government marks. The Provincial Court granted bail 
and, subsequently, the parole authorities cancelled their warrant. 
Mr. Erickson was then released. All this took place in February of 
1982 prior to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms becoming effec-
tive. The trial took place after the Charter became effective. 
Six days into the trial Mr. Erickson's defence counsel submitted that 
the evidence of the government marks was inadmissible as the search 
warrant was confined to narcotics. He claimed that the search was 
unreasonable and had infringed Erickson's right to be secure against 
such a practice. It was also stressed that the conduct of the 
officers, particularly in respect to the "arbitrary" detention of 
Erickson, amounted to another infringement of his rights 
The Provincial Court trial judge "poured through" an abundance of 
decisions on these matters and zeroed in on the custody issue. He 
found that there had been no malice or negligence on the part of 
police but nevertheless Erickson's detention had been in violation of 
s. 454 c.c. in that he was not brought before a Justice of the Peace 
without delay. Instead of determining if the admissibility of 
evidence was affected by the unlawful detention (s. 24(2) of the 
Charter), he turned to s. 24(1) of the Charter and quashed the indict-
ment as a remedy to Erickson being denied his right not to be arbi-
trarily detained. 
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The Crown appealed the Provincial Court Judge 's decision to the B. C. 
Court of Appeal and argued that the Charter provisions were not retro-
spective in respect to the infringement, if any, of Erickson's right 
in these circumstances. However, the Court of Appeal declined to deal 
with these issues. In other words, it did not determine if the 
detention was appropriate or the search reasonable. The Court simply 
addressed itself to the question if the quashing of the indictment as 
a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter, was "appropriate and just" and 
if there was any grounds in law for making the order to quash the 
indictment. 
The Court of Appeal held that the Provincial Court Judge had erred in 
law and had used a cannon to shoot a rabbit. What carried a lot of 
weight as a fundamental issue to the Court's conclusion was the fact 
that no malice or negligence was found on the part of the police 
officers. 
Said the Court of Appeal in regards to the justification of invoking a 
remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter: 
"He granted the most sweeping and drastic remedy in the 
arsenal of remedies without any factual basis that could 
possibly permit the conclusion that it would be either just 
or appropriate to do so." • • • • • "The need to impress upon 
all parties the requirement that the law be obeyed is not 
enough to justify granting a remedy which is not otherwise 
just and appropriate. I say that with full recognition of 
the fundamental nature of the right created by s. 454 and 
the importance of it being complied with by those who are 
obligated to do so; but a breach does not in itself justify 
turning the system on its head" • • • • • "It simply does not 
follow that every breach must lead to some remedy being 
granted at trial. The purpose of the trial is, as it was 
before the Charter, to decide whether the accused is 
guilty. Breaches of Charter rights do not become a proper 
subject of enquiry at trial simply because they occurred in 
relation to the charge being tried". 
These comments generally reflect the Appeal Court's opinion on the 
subject. The Court was also subtly critical of the trial judge as he 
had invited defence counsel to apply for the remedy under 24(1) of the 
Charter (such application is requisite to implementing a remedy). 
Indictment reinstated. 
Provincial Court was ordered to try Mr 
Erickson 
Note: In relation to the custody of Mr. Erickson in regards to the 
charge of possessing the government marks, the Crown conceded that the 
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parole warrant did not preclude compliance with s. 454 C.C. Although 
the B. C. Court of Appeal did not rule on this issue, they strongly 
hinted to agree with the Crown's concession on that issue. 
* * * * * 
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POLICE ENTERING HOME TO ASSIST VICTIM AND INVESTIGATE A STABBING -
OBSTRUCTING A PEACE OFFICER - LAWFUL PERFORMANCE OF DUTY 
Regina v. Custer [1984] 4 W.W.R. 144 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal April 1984. 
Police received a report that someone had been stabbed and attended at 
the location. They found no one there, and attended at a nearby house 
and spoke to the accused, the occupier. He conceded that his wife had 
been stabbed but assured that she was perfectly all right. The 
officers asked for entry into the home to investigate the stabbing and 
assist the victim. They did not in any way indicate any suspicion 
that the husband (the accused) who blocked their way, was responsible 
for the stabbing. 
When the officers forced their way into the home a struggle ensued. 
One consoling factor to the officers must have been the proof that the 
victim of the stabbing was all right. She emerged from the house and 
"threw herself on the back of one of the officers". 
The accused was tried for obstructing the police officers "in the 
investigation of a complaint of a person being stabbed". From all of 
the evidence, the trial judge concluded that: 
"... the peace officers did not want to gain entry to make 
an arrest. If they believed that the accused had committed 
or was committing an offence related to his wife they would 
have arrested him on the steps. lf they believed that he 
was not a party to the stabbing then they would conclude 
from his lack of concern about his wife that the stabbing 
was not continuing as he stood there talking. What they did 
want to do was determine the extent of the wife's injuries, 
give aid, if necessary, and find out who was responsible". 
He classified the issue surrounding the case as a classic conflict 
between two rights; that of the state to investigate crime and protect 
human life and the right to protect the privacy of the home. In any 
event, the Court held that the circumstances had not triggered the 
common law which authorized the officers to enter the home to prevent 
death or serious injury. The prerequisite reasonable and probable 
grounds simply did not exist. 
The Crown unsuccessfully appealed the verdict of "not guilty" and 
finally ended up arguing the case in Saskatchewan's highest court, the 
Court of Appeal. This Court gave lengthy reasons for judgement and 
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explored the three most significant cases on this point* decided by 
the Supreme Court of Canada and found that all were distinct from this 
case. 
None of the established common law provisions that authorize police to 
enter private property without warrant did apply. Another point which 
hindered the Court to include the police common law duty "to preserve 
life and prevent serious injury" was the wording of the charge. The 
Crown claimed that the officers were obstructed exclusively in their 
duty in the "investigation of a complaint of a person being stabbed". 
In other words, the Crown particularized the duty upon which it relied 
to show obstruction on the part of the accused. This, the Court of 
Appeal claimed, prevented them from considering the duty of preserving 
life and preventing injury 
Crown's appeal dismissed. 
Acquittal upheld. 
Comment: Anyone can understand the unenviable dilemma the officers 
found themselves in. Assuming that the husband or someone else was in 
the process of murdering the woman or had already done so, the police 
officers knew that a stabbing had taken place. The victim "is all 
right" said a person who was hostile towards them. Should they in 
these circumstances have left when told to "fuck off"? Again, assum-
ing that in a case like this, a death resulted and it was shown that 
had the officers acted at the time they were at the door, they could 
have saved the woman's life, I do not believe that their leaving, as 
the law seems to say they must, would receive public acceptance. 
One of the officers in his testimony said he thought, at the time, 
that the stabbing might be continuing. However, this was rejected as 
speculation and conjecture and something without evidential support. 
Hindsight in these events is wonderful, but until the lady emerged and 
vigorously attacked those who thought to look after her welfare and 
interest, the predicament of the officers was precarious. 
One comfort is the indication that had the information included 
"preservation of life and prevention of injury" as a duty in respect 
to which the officers were obstructed, the Crown's appeal would have 
been allowed. This we can infer from the following and final comments 
in the reasons for judgement: 
"While the evidence might have supported a conviction (I do 
not make a finding in this respect) had the charge been one 
* Colet v. R 57 C.C.C. (2d) 105 (1981) - [1981] 2 W.W.R. 472. 
Eccles v. Bourque [1975] 1 W.W.R. 609 - 19 C.C.C. (2d) 129 
R. v. Stenning [1970] 3 C.C.C. 145 
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alleging obstruction of the constable s duty to preserve 
life and prevent serious injury, that was not the charge 
before the Court". 
* * * * * 
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B. C. PROVISIONS FOR THE TAKING OF BLOOD 
SAMPLES FROM SUSPECTED IMPAIRED DRIVERS 
The Queen and Hurst, Supreme Court of B. C., Victoria Registry 
84/1285, July 1984 
It was predictable that the recent B. c. statutory provisions author-
izing police, doctors and registered nurses, and analysts to respec-
tively demand, take and analyze samples of blood of a driver whose 
blood-alcohol content is believed to be in excess of 80 mlg. per 100 
millilitres of blood, would be tested for jurisdictional validity at 
the first opportunity. 
Mr. Hurst refused to allow a sample of blood to be taken from him 
despite the fact a police officer had made a proper and authorized 
demand of him under the B. C. Legislation. He entered a plea of not 
guilty and at his trial the Provincial Court Judge held that the 
provincial Motor Vehicle Act legislation regarding blood tests is 
ultra vires the provincial government in that it contradicts s. 237(2) 
of the Criminal Code. This Criminal Code section states that for the 
purposes of this section no one is required to . give samples of any 
bodily substance for the purpose of analysis. If asked to do so, a 
refusal or the fact that no sample was taken may not be subject of 
comment by anyone in the proceedings. The Crown appealed. 
The Provincial Court, in essence, had held that if the provincial 
legislation contradicts federal law then the provincial enactment is 
ultra vires the provincial government. The Supreme Justice held that 
this at best was a misconception (and a prevalent one).* 
* The B.N.A. Act of 1867 and the Canada Act of 1982, divide the powers 
to legislate between the federal and provincial governments. Each 
government is supreme within it's legislative purview. That is a 
fundamental ingredient of a federation. Basically, when a govern-
ment legislates in an area that is not within its legislative compe-
tence, then that legislation is ultra vires that government. In 
some cases there is an overlapping jurisdiction and both senior 
governments have jurisdiction to legislate. When this happens the 
paramountcy doctrine is applied and the federal legislation super-
sedes that of the province. Such legislation, though intra vires 
that provincial government, may be inoperable if it contradicts 
federal provisions. When legislation is excessive from a constitu-
tional viewpoint in that it, for instance is discriminatory the 
Courts may declare it invalid despite the fact that in terms of the 
division of legislative powers, the law was intra vires the senior 
government that enacted it. Then, of course, there is the principle 
of residual power. In the federation of Canada (unlike in some 
other f!!dffations) what.ever has Rot been assigned in the constitu-tion beta s the Feaeral governme ~ 
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If the B. C. "blood sample" legislation is repugnant to that of the 
Federal government, it may be inoperable but it is nonetheless intra 
vires the B. C. government, said the Supreme Court. It held that the 
provincial governments in Canada have jurisdiction to legislate such 
law as is in question here*. This left the Justice to decide if the 
provincial provisions did contradict s. 237 (2) C.C. and therefore 
would be inoperable. 
There are many examples where both the federal and provincial govern-
ments have within their legislative purview enacted law affecting the 
same sphere of behaviour, regulating the same activities. A knee-jerk 
reaction to this is to believe that federal law always supersedes that 
of the provinces. That can be the case where, by applying the para-
mountry doctrine, it is found that these two valid sets of law are 
inconsistent with one another; where the one contradicts or defies the 
other' then the federal law has it and the provincial legislation, 
though intra vires the provincial government is inoperable. 
However, if the two sets of valid law, one federal and one provincial, 
for instance, simply give authorities an option to proceed under 
either, then both are operable. 
When we still had only intoxicated and impaired driving offences 
provided for in the Criminal Code, there was no provision for demand-
ing a breath sample. The best police could hope for were volunteered 
samples. In 1958 Saskatchewan did something about this and provided 
in its Vehicles Act that where suspected impaired drivers did not give 
a sample of breath, their driver's licences would be suspended and 
eventually revoked. That legislation flew in the face of the then 
Criminal Code stipulation that no one would be required to provide any 
bodily substance including breath. The Saskatchewan government 
referred this legislation to their Court of Appeal for an opinion. 
The reference reached the Supreme Court of Canada. An eight-man 
decision of this Court held that the Saskatchewan legislation did not 
specifically compel a citizen to give a sample of breath despite the 
fact that he could not refuse with impunity. Furthermore the Court 
found that the Saskatchewan law was not in conflict with the Criminal 
Code provision that no one, for the purpose of this section, could be 
compelled to give a sample of breath. Therefore, the Saskatchewan law 
was operable. 
* Reference re validity of 2. 92(4) of the Vehicle Act 1957. 
(Saskatchewan) (1958) S.C.R. 608. 
* The Provincial Secretar Province of Prince Edward Island v. 
Egan et. al. 19 1 
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The matter of parallel legislation is a bit more complex than 
expl~ined here and there are more tests to these turf issues. For 
instance, where provincial provisions are obvious, attempts for 
authorities to gain evidence supporting Federal offences, or where 
they create procedures affecting Federal criminal process, the issue 
becomes a little more dicy. The Saskatchewan legislation was very 
close to doing the former. 
The B. C. "blood sample" law operates quite separate and distinct from 
the drinking-driving law in the Criminal Code. The B. c. provisions 
are; for lack of a better term, self contained. No part of it is an 
evidential conduit to the Criminal Code offence. The latter statute 
provides for a conviction of "over 80 mlg." by means of compulsory 
breath tests and certificate evidence. The B. C. provisions are 
similar and lead to the conviction of a provincial offence of "over 80 
mlg" by means of a compulsory blood test and certificate evidence. 
Whenever a police officer demands a blood test he does so exclusively 
for provincial purposes and is then excluded from proceeding under the 
Criminal Code. These provisions, said the Supreme Court Justice, are 
not in conflict with section 237(2) C.C. The Parliament of Canada 
decided that they would not require anyone to give a blood sample for 
the purposes of gaining evidence for their drinking-driving law. The 
Province of B. c., having equal jurisdiction to create drinking-
driving laws, decided to include a compulsory submission to a blood 
test to gain evidence for their own drinking-driving laws. This means 
that there is a difference but no conflict. 
B. C. blood sample law were held to be 
operable. 
* * * * * 
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CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
THE WRIT OF ASSISTANCE AND REASONABLE SEARCH 
The Queen v. Hamill, B. C. Court of Appeal, CA 001117 Vancouver Registry, 
September 1984. 
Various Provincial and County Courts have addressed the constitutional 
validity of the much debated Writs of Assistance. Since the Charter, the 
Court of Appeal seemed to have been inundated with appeals involving the 
Writs and it, therefore, decided to amalgamate these cases and included 
three other appeals* into their reasons for judgment in the Hamill case. 
On page 1 of Volume 14 of this publication, a synopsis of the Vancouver 
County Court's reasons for judgment in R. v. Cuff outline the issues 
involved in the question on the constitutional validity of Writs of Assis-
tance. I think it fair to say that the B. C. Court of Appeal has now over-
turned the decision in Cuff and here are the reasons why. 
The lower Courts had various approaches and answers to the complicated 
question surrounding this issue. Some held that the writ was unconstitu-
tional but still admitted the evidence resulting from a search where a writ 
was used as such admission would not bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute. Others, like the Judge in the Cuff case, rejected all 
direct and indirect evidence that resulted from the use of a Writ of 
Assistance. That judge seemed even anxious to get at the writ and left his 
personal feelings not covered on the matter. This decision by the B. C. 
Court of Appeal will bring some consistency in the interim period. The 
issue will inevitably reach the Supreme Court of Canada and if it disagrees 
with the B. C. Court of Appeal's decision we will simply have to adjust 
again. 
The B. c. Court of Appeal firstly concluded that there is only one section 
of the Charter that applies to the question before them, and that is 
section 8 which assures us of a right to be secure against unreasonable 
search and seizure (some judges had brought section 7 of the Charter into 
the picture as well). The main objective of the Court was to determine if 
section lO(l)(a) of the Narcotic Control Act, which authorizes a Writ of 
Assistance to be used for the search of a dwelling house, was inconsistent 
with section 8 of the Charter; in other words does section 10 N.C.A. 
validly confer the power to enter and search under the authority of a Writ 
of Assistance. Some Courts have referred to a search under the authority 
of a Writ of Assistance as a warrantless search and for all practical 
purposes it is, said the Court of Appeal. Opponents of the Writ of assis-
tance claim that any search of a home other than those specifically 
* 
R. v. Sieben CA 000878, R. v. Descamps CA 000983 
R. v. Pasztor CA 001154 
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authorized by an independent member of the judiciary are unreasonable and 
excessive (save those to preserve life and in fresh pursuit of an offen-
der). Determination of the necessity of a search and the judgment whether 
or not there are the prerequisite reasonable and probable grounds, cannot 
be left with the law enforcement officers, they say. Others can see the 
need for the Writ but favor that it must be shown that its use is neces-
sary, in that the obtaining of a warrant was impractical in the circum-
stances. 
In the U. S. they have struggled for decades with the question whether a 
warrantless search can be reasonable. Their debates have resulted in an 
overwhelming volume of cases which has caused incredible complexities. 
Basically a judicially granted warrant is the best protection against 
unreasonable search. Some claim that if a search is warrantless, it is 
nonetheless capable of being reasonable; others argue that any warrantless 
search is unreasonable • • • and on go the discussions. The U. S. laws and 
those of other commonwealth nations were reviewed recently by the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in Regina v. Rao (May 1984, unreported). The case is 
interesting on these various viewpoints but is distinct from this case as 
the place search in "Rao" was not a dwelling house. 
As interesting as all the preliminaries may be the B. C. Court of Appeal 
had to come to grips with reality and answer the narrow question before 
them: "Are the powers granted in s. lO(l)(a) N.C.A. excessive"? Defence 
counsel argued that it could not be anything else but excessive. The 
B. C. Court of Appeal disagreed! It said that what has to be considered is 
the particular circumstances encountered and the seriousness of the evil 
against which the law is directed. The Court said to be cognizant of the 
accusation that the search provisions under N.C.A. are excessive and abused 
by police, however, it concluded that "it may be useful to take note of 
what has been said about them by those who have had reason to consider them 
most carefully". 
Quoting from the 1971 Le Dain Commission Report, the Court observed the 
following: 
"A writ of assistance is a general warrant ••• " "In acting under 
a writ of assistance a police officer must reasonably believe 
that the dwelling house contains a prohibited drug ..... "Officers 
who hold these writs are obliged by R.C.M. Police regulations to 
report on the use they make of them (writs), and they are subject 
to disciplinary measures for any apparent abuse ••• ". "The chief 
distinction between a search warrant and the writ is the conveni-
ence of the latter". The report sums up the difficulties in 
firstly obtaining a warrant under many conditions so prevalent in 
the illicit drug trade and concludes that "though the writ and 
many other necessary practices in drug-law enforcement tend to 
bring police and law some disrepute, taken the writs away would 
seriously handicap such enforcement ••• " It would appear there-
fore, that they (writs) must be regarded as special cost inherent 
in the criminal law prohibition of the distribution and use of 
drugs" said the report. 
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The 1969 Quimet report (Canadian Committee on Corrections) came to similar 
conclusions. It found that the use of writs was carefully monitored and 
that the broad and apparent excessive powers they confer, had not been 
abused. Furthermore, the committee observed that the writ is used in two 
areas of vital national interest, illicit drug trades and revenue. This 
coupled with the practical necessity of search at specific and unpredict-
able times in investigations caused the committee to leave the grantiµg and 
use of writs of assistance undisturbed. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal considered these reports "statements from respon-
sible sources" that support continuation of the unabused warrantless 
searches, but was hesitant to hold that these committee findings were valid 
and appropriate in 1984. 
It was suggested to the Court that the test of "reasonableness" in respect 
to the use of a writ, is whether it would, in the circumstances, be 
practical to obtain a warrant. If the answer is "yes" and the writ was 
used, the search would consequently be unreasonable. The Court of Appeal 
rejected this idea and predicted that such a rule would cause trials to 
become minute examinations on that question with all the useless hindsight 
as a benefit, while the investigator "must, at the crucial times, assess 
those matters on the basis of his experience and training and often on the 
basis of hunch or instinct". The exercise to determine such practicability 
would add nothing to our right to be secure against unreasonable search and 
would take much away from our right to be secure against crime. 
Another option the Court had was to follow the American rule which, in 
essence, dictates that warrantless searches are (with few exceptions) per 
se unreasonable and unconstitutional. This idea was also rejected as the 
Charter would specifically have stated that, if that had been the intent. 
At this stage of their reasons, the Court of Appeal found that section 10 
N.C.A. is not inconsistent with the Charter provisions and writs of assis-
tance are, therefore, constitutionally valid. It referred to their ruling 
in R. v. Collins* in which a clear interpretation of section 24(2) of the 
Charter was given on how evidence resulting from an unreasonable search is 
only inadmissible in evidence if admission would bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute. This makes it clear that our Court of Appeal 
steers clear from U. S. strict rules on the reasonableness of search or 
exclusion of evidence. In any event, in regards to the former, the Court 
disagrees with its Ontario counterpart and in respect to the latter it 
said: 
"It is neither just nor appropriate to exclude evidence simply 
because the wrong done to the accused person is so trivial that 
no civil remedy would be of practical benefit to him. To 
approach the matter in that way is to treat the exclusion of 
evidence as something of no great importance, as a remedy to be 
granted lightly. On the contrary, I would suggest, it is a 
* See page 1 Volume 12 of this publication. 
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drastic and inherently dangerous tool which should be employed 
with caution. The purpose of a trial is to get at the truth of 
the matters in issue. The effect of granting an application to 
exclude evidence is to suppress the truth ...... 
Reasonableness of search was prior to the Charter, never an issue and back-
ground information in possession of the investigators which guided··. their 
conduct during a search needed not to be examined by the Courts. Since the 
Charter, the information an officer has and the manner in which he conducts 
a search must now dovetail to determine the reasonableness of a search. 
This means that a new dimension has been added to our trials and Courts 
will have to deal with the background information in evidence. This no 
doubt will often be to the detriment of the accused despite the fact that 
such evidence of background knowledge adduced is not to prove the truth of 
its content but to explain the officer's state of mind and justification 
for his actions. 
In this case the accused was seized and choked immediately after the 
officers entered the dwelling under the authority of a writ of assistance. 
The officer responsible testified this was in the circumstances a natural 
instinct and a method taught to officers. Also, the officers had, from a 
computer print-out, learned of the accused's propensity to violence. What 
about the admissibility of such evidence? 
The Court again referred to their decision in Collins (supra) that: 
• • • it was for the Crown to lay the groundwork to show what 
knowledge the police had". 
In relation to the apparent unfairness to adduce such evidence it must be 
remembered that the accused raised the issue of infringement of rights and 
must prove that on the balance of probabilities to trigger the exclusionary 
rule. He is, at it were, the author of his own misfortune in this respect 
while the Crown does not have to show the lawfulness or the reasonableness 
(there is a distinction between these two) of the search as a prerequisite 
to the admissibility of what was seized. In other words: 
"If the accused does not apply under s. 24 for exclusion of the 
evidence, there is no issue to which either the legality or 
reasonableness of the search can be relevant". 
The sentences that best synopsizes the Court's conclusion on this issue; 
is: 
"If the search was carried out under the authority of s. 10 
N.C.A., it will be a reasonable one under s. 8 (Charter) only if 
the officer had the requisite reasonable belief in the presence 
of the narcotic". 
and 
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"Every unreasonable search is an infringement of the individual's 
right under section 8 (Charter). But not every unreasonable 
search can satisfy the second test under s. 24(2) (Charter)". 
In other words, if a search is unreasonable the evidence resulting there-
from is still admissible if such admission does not bring the administra-
tion of justice into disrepute. In this case the search was lawful and 
reasonable. 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
Acquittal set aside and new trial 
directed. 
Comment: The welcome views by the B. C. Court of Appeal are encouraging 
and it is sincerely hoped that this reasonable interpretation will be 
shared by the Supreme Court of Canada. Many members of the Judiciary, 
particularly those of the lower Courts, have interpreted the Charter 
provision very much in favour of those accused of crimes. Our superior 
Court continuously issues warnings to those judges in the front trenches 
not to be too generous and not to give too liberal an interpretation to our 
new Charter and that, with some exceptions, there is nothing new under the 
Canadian constitutional sun in terms of rights and freedoms. Other 
factions totally disagree and reason quite to the contrary. Of the 
greatest interest, for instance, is the debate over the meaning of section 
1 of the Charter which says that this part of our new constitution is 
subject only to such reasonable limits as prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Does this mean 
that we should not create legal luxuries we cannot afford or that where it 
fits in our ideals we must implement and allow the exercise of freedom and 
rights at all costs. A similar (in principle) looming issue is the 
apparent distinction in the sensitive subsection (2) to section 24 of the 
Charter (exclusionay rule) between the English and French words used. The 
English wording dictates the exclusion of evidence where admission "would" 
bring the administration of justice, while the French version uses the word 
"could". I' 11 leave you to ponder over the immense distinction between 
these wordings particularly in view of the provision in the Interpretations 
Act that stipulates that where there is a difference in the wording of law 
in our two official languages, the version most favorable to an accused 
must be applied. What I am implying is that, despite judgements like 
these, we are far from settled on the meaning of our new Charter. 
* * * * * 
31 
RIGHT TO PRIVACY TO CONSULT COUNSEL 
Regina v. Peters, County Court of Westminster, New Westminster Registry 
No. X-012155, June 1984 
The accused was under demand to give samples of breath and while at the 
police station he phoned his lawyer. Police were within earshot while he 
spoke to his lawyer. However, the accused did not request privacy and 
appeared satisfied and comfortable as the circumstances were. The trial 
judge held that despite the accused had not asked for privacy it should 
have been afforded him. Presumably under either of the subsections of s. 
24 of the Charter (remedy or exclusion) the judge acquitted the accused of 
impaired driving and refusing to blow. The Crown should have lead evidence 
to support the conclusion that the accused was given privacy while he exer-
cised his right to consult counsel said the Judge. The acquittals were 
appealed. 
In 1977, prior to the Charter becoming effective, the Supreme Court of 
Canadal held that a suspect need not be afforded privacy to consult counsel 
unless he requests it. The accused had claimed at trial that he had 
refused to blow as he had been inhibited in speaking to his lawyer. He was 
nevertheless convicted as he should have asked for a greater degree of 
privacy. However, there was a dissenting judgement in which three justices 
of the Supreme Court of Canada felt that privacy should be a natural part 
of the right to consult and retain counsel. 
The defence lawyer in this Peters case had argued that the dissenting 
judgement by the Supreme Court of Canada should, in view of the Charter now 
being effective, be followed. The trial judge apparently agreed. 
The very same issue has been argued at least twice in B. c. County Courts2 
in 1983, since the Charter. The cases are on all fours with this Peters 
case. In one the Court held the suspect 's rights had not been infringed 
and there was no excuse to refuse to blow. In the other case the Court 
held that the accused's rights would only have been infringed if he had 
asked for privacy and was not given it. 
The County Court Judge agreed with his brothers, allowed the Crown's appeal 
and ordered a new trial. 
1 
2 
* * * * * 
Jumaga v. The ~een (1977) 1 S.C.R. 486. 
R. v. F'ellowfied (1983) 24 M. V .R. 97 and R. v Rosenan (unreported) 
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FAILURE TO INCLUDE ALL PLACES AND NAMES INTENDED TO BE 
SUBJECT TO INTERCEPTION IN APPLICATION FOR AUTHORIZATION 
Regina v. Meidel, Meidel, Al var ado, Moser and Mc Isaac, County Court of 
Vancouver Island, Victoria Registry No. 27589, January 1984. 
The accused applied to have set aside an authorization setting out certain 
narcotic offences in respect of which private communications could be 
intercepted. They claimed that police had misled the Court in the applica-
tion for the authorization by failing to disclose the names of persons 
whose private communication they fully intended to intercept. The same was 
claimed in respect to addresses at which police intended to intercept tele-
communications. 
The Court found as a fact that the authorization did not include names of 
persons whose private communications the police intended to intercept. 
These names as well as the addresses were known to the police at the time 
of the application. This caused the Court to say that the police "did not 
act with scrupulous regard for the obligations of the judge ..... Hence the 
supporting material did not comply with what section 178.12 C.C. stipulates 
must be contained in the application. What aggravated the situation was 
that the telephone intended to be tapped (but not included in the applica-
tion) were public telephones and this would mean an invasion of the privacy 
of persons unconnected with the offences. 
"It is not for police authorities to fail to fully inform that 
judge and indeed to conceal their true intention from the judge, 
in breach of the requirements of the statute and to conduct the 
interception of such public telephone lines in such manner as 
those authorities deem appropriate". 
The judge examined "the packet" and particularly the affidavit. He came to 
the conclusion that the granting of the authorization in view of the 
evidence before him and that contained in the affidavit, was contrary to 
s. 178.12 C.C. The judge said that police had not been frank, open and 
fair and he found to have been misled when he granted the authorization 
and, therefore, had been unable to fulfill his obligation under the Act. 
Defence Application granted. 
Authorization set aside 
* * * * * 
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ARMED ROBBERY - FORCED RESTITUTION 
Regina v. Ellis, County of Westminster, New Westminster Registry No. 
X011424, March 1984 
The accused was "ripped off" for $1,100 in a drug deal and he knew who had 
done this to him. With the assistance of "Crazy Brian" armed with a 
shotgun, and another friend carrying a club, he went a-calling at the 
address where the two rip-off artists were. When the two perpetrators of 
the rip-off did not immediately show signs of making restitution, Crazy 
Brian came on the scene and matters were settled inside the house. A total 
of $250 was collected and as this was not enough in the accused's opinion 
he demanded that a car owned by one of the debtors was signed over to him. 
The scene with "Crazy Brian" brandishing his gun was described as a 
"madhouse" and the occupants of the home in which this happened were liter-
ally terrorized. 
In view of the fact that theft is an essential ingredient to robbery, the 
accused claimed that he was entitled to be acquitted of armed robbery. 
After all he did not commit a theft but simply collected monies he had an 
honest belief to be entitled to. In other words, he claimed to have 
"colour of right". He drew the attention of the Court to an English case 1 
where a man had used a knife on his employer to collect wages owed to him. 
Whatever crime he committed in doing so, the English Court of Appeal held 
it was not robbery due to the lack of theft. 
In this case the accused had given his victims $1, 100 to buy drugs for 
him. The transaction went off the tracks somewhere as the accused did not 
get the drugs nor his money back. The English Mr. Skivington had done 
honest labour and thereby had a claim to wages from his victim, but the 
accused's claim was founded on the commission of a crime. Is there a 
distinction? The Court in its deliberations on this point, asked if, for 
instance, a gambling debt could be collected by a means the accused applied 
and not commit robbery? After all, a gambling debt is not a lawful debt 
and cannot be legally enforced. 
There is another B. C. case on nearly all fours with this one2. In that 
and other cases, the Courts have held that this kind of defence must with-
stand the test of the accused's belief to have a lawful claim to what he 
took. That test is a subjective one, meaning that it is not important if 
the accused had in law a claim but whether he genuinely believed he had a 
lawful claim. The Court quoted the English Court of Appeal: 
"... a claim of right exists whenever a man honestly believes 
that he has a lawful claim, even though it may be completely 
unfounded in law or in fact". 
1 R. v. Skivington (1967) 51 Criminal Appeal Reports 
2 R. v. Sherman, 47 C.C.C. 521 (B.C.C.A.) 
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The Court concluded that the accused, if he believed he had a lawful claim, 
would have gone to the police or pursued the matter civilly. He proceeded 
in his bizaare manner of collecting a debt, because he knew he did not have 
a "lawful" claim. Without a genuine belief in such a claim, the accused s 
defence could not succeed. 
* * * * * 
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ADMISSIBILITY OF VOLUNTARY STATEMENT AND 
SECTION 10 CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
Regina v. Abraham, County Court of Prince Rupert, Smithers, B. C. No. 
4276XZ February 1984. 
The accused was on trial for a sexual assault on a 12 year old girl. The 
girl had been given an alcoholic beverage to drink. While she was asleep 
and in the presence of the girl's 11 year old sister and an adult, the 
alleged assault took place. Police investigated and interviewed the 11 
year old witness. Before they interviewed the adult witness, word got to 
the accused that police wanted to talk to him. He went to the police 
station and spoke to the investigators. Whatever he said became subject to 
a voir dire to determine its admissibility in evidence. The Court held 
that the interview was civilized, free of any improprieties and that the 
accused had voluntarily given a verbal and then a written statement. 
Prior to making the verbal statement, the accused had not been informed of 
his right to counsel. This he claimed was an infringement of his right 
under s. 10 of the Charter and therefore the statement should be inadmis-
sible by virtue of s. 24(2) of the Charter. Police claimed, however, that 
the accused was not detained when he was interviewed, although they 
considered him a suspect. After he had made his verbal admission of guilt, 
the officers told the accused of his rights to counsel which did not deter 
him from giving the investigators a written statement as well. The 
officers had reasoned that prior to the verbal admission they had insuf-
ficient evidence to arrest or detain the accused. After that admission, 
things had changed and, al though they did not arrest the accused, they 
considered him detained. 
The Court held that when the accused made the verbal statement he was not 
detained and there was no infringements of the accused's rights. The 
voluntary statement was therefore admissible. 
The accused then challenged the admissibility of the written statement. 
Although the investigators had told the accused (after the verbal state-
ment) of his right to counsel they had not told him promptly for what 
reason he was detained. Crown Counsel retorted that the accused had been 
asked about the alleged sexual assault and had confessed to it prior to the 
need to tell him why he was detained. In other words, he knew why. 
The Court held that the duty to tell a person why he is detained is 
unambiguous (lO(a) Charter). The accused had not been told and, therefore, 
his rights had been infringed. However, admitting the statement in these 
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circumstances would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
Both statements ruled admissible. 
The admissibility of statements and infringements of an accused's right 
were also discussed in the B. C. Supreme Court in R. v. Stone (No. 00049 
Quesnel Registry, May 10,/84). 
In that case two officers were called to the accused's home where a dead 
man and woman were found. When the officers tried to get the accused away 
from the scene to ask him some questions, he tried to enter the house and 
when stopped, he fought the officers. He was handcuffed and placed in the 
police car where the officers spoke to the accused for nearly an hour 
before special investigators arrived. When the accused was booked nearly 
two hours after his first encounter with police, he was told for the first 
time of his arrest, the reason for it, and his right to counsel. He phoned 
a lawyer and was interviewed again a couple of hours later. 
The statements were all ruled to be admissible in evidence. The one in the 
police cruiser was found to be voluntary and the infringements of the 
Charter in the circumstances, would not bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute. In regard to the statement made a few hours after the 
accused had been informed of his rights and had consulted a lawyer the 
defence argued that the requirements of s. 10 of the Charter go beyond just 
informing a detained or arrested person of his rights. The lawyer for the 
defence claimed that when a person has decided to retain and instruct 
counsel, no person in authority may interview that person in the absence of 
counsel. 
The Supreme Court Justice rejected this theory. Although a prisoner may 
well be told by his lawyer not to say anything he may chose to ignore that 
advice. That "surely is his prerogative and responsibility", said the 
Court. 
All statements were admitted in 
evidence. 
* * * * * 
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UNREASONABLE SEARCH - TAKING URINE SAMPLES FROM DRAINAGE BAG 
Regina v. L.A.R., 9 C.C.C. (3d) 144. 
Manitoba Court of Appeal. 
The accused had an all night celebration on the event of his 18th birth-
day. While driving home he was involved in a serious motor vehicle acci-
dent and ended up in hospital. Police found him smelling of liquor and 
shouting profanities at the nurses. As a blood sample was denied the 
officers they asked a nurse to give them a urine sample out of the drainage 
bag which was fed by a catheter used in treating the accused. The nurse 
complied and the accused was charged with impaired driving and was 
acquitted. Crown appealed. 
The admissibility of the accused's blood-alcohol content established by the 
analysis of his urine was fought on the basis that the taking of the urine 
was an unreasonable search contrary to s. 8. of the Charter. This as no 
search warrant or consent from the accused was obtained. 
The Court responded that in these circumstances there was nothing to hold 
that what was lawful before the Charter has now become "unreasonable". The 
Charter arms individuals with rights but does not disarm the community and 
render it unprotected, particularly not in "the critical battlefield of 
search and seizure". The Court reminded that the crusades in the U. S. 
under the banner of the fourth amendment to its constitution "have often 
glorified a law less reasonable than the search it condemned". The Court 
further observed that the trial judge had confused astute investigative 
practices with oppression or abuse. It concluded that there was nothing 
unreasonable about the seizure. 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
New trial ordered. 
* * * * * 
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DOES THE PRESUMPTION THAT A PERSON WHO BREAKS AND ENTERS INTENDS TO COMMIT 
AN INDICTABLE OFFENCE ALSO APPLY TO THOSE WHO ATTEMPT TO BREAK AND ENTER? 
R. v. Garlow, 10 C.C.C. (2d) 575 
Ontario Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada, May 1982 and May 1984 
respectively. 
Section 306(2) C.C. includes a presumption that when a person breaks and 
enters a place he does so to commit an indictable offence therein. Without 
such intent there is no offence under s. 306(1) c.c. 
The accused attempted to break into a place and, relying on s. 306(2) c.c. 
the Crown intended to prove that the intent of the accused was to commit an 
indictable offence once inside. The trial judge used the presumption to 
convict the accused, despite the fact that he could not find from the 
evidence, what specifically the accused intended to do if he had been 
successful. In view of s. 306(2) C.C. that does not seem to matter. 
The accused appealed and the Ontario Court of Appeal as well as the Supreme 
Court of Canada agreed that the trial judge erred in law. Both Courts held 
that the presumption of intent does not apply to attempted breaking and 
entering. Therefore, the trial judge must be able from the evidence, to 
find what specific indictable offence the accused intended to commit had 
his attempt been successful. 
Accused's Appeal allowed. 
Conviction quashed. 
* * * * * 
